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attachment proceedings in New York will soon be resolved by the
Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction in Sugar on April
14, 1975.267 It is hoped that the nature of the hearing and other safe-
guards contemplated by the due process clause in the area of prejudg-
ment attachment will be clarified in order to avoid future uncertainty
in other states as well.
CPLR 6202: Retaliatory adoption of Seider v. Roth by New Hamp-
shire.
The Seider v. Roth26 8 doctrine, which permits the grounding of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant upon attach-
ment of the contractual obligations contained in the defendant's
automobile liability insurance policy,26 9 continues to generate new
267 43 U.S.L.W. 3550 (U.S. Apr. 14, 1975) (No. 74-859).
268 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), noted in 67 COLUM. L. REv.
550 (1967); 51 MINN. L. REV. 158 (1966); 43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 58 (1968). For an excellent
discussion of Seiders development and a thorough analysis of the constitutional and pro-
cedural issues involved, see 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 5201, supp. commentary at 15-74 (1974).
269 Under Seider, the duty to defend and indemnify is attached as a debt within the
meaning of CPLR 5201 and CPLR 6202. CPLR 6202 states that "[a]ny debt or property
against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in section 5201 is subject
to attachment." CPLR 5201(a) in pertinent part provides:
A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or which
is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor, whether
it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or non-resident,
unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the judgment.
Seider held that the obligation of the insurer to defend and indemnify becomes fixed
at the time of the accident. Critics have challenged this analysis, contending that at that
point, the insurer's obligation is contingent and not fixed. Moreover, criticism has also
been directed at what has been characterized as the "bootstrap" approach of Seider,
whereby the contractual obligation to defend and indemnify, which arguably does not
mature until jurisdiction has been acquired over the insured, is seized to provide the
sole basis for jurisdiction. See, e.g., Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 115, 216 N.E2d 312,
315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1966) (Burke, J., dissenting); Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d
305, 316, 234 N.E.2d 669, 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 642 (1967) (Burke, J., dissenting); Mini-
chiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J., dissenting), aff'd en
banc, 410 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir.) (Anderson, J., joined by Lumbard, C.J. & Moore, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
In Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967),
rearg. denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (mem.), the Court
of Appeals held that in a Seider suit, recovery is to be limited to the face amount of the
policy and the insured is entitled to make a limited appearance, i.e., he may defend on
the merits without subjecting himself to in personam jurisdiction. The constitutionality
of the Seider doctrine was thereafter upheld on the strength of the limited appearance
created by Simpson. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), aff'd en banc,
410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
In addition, several decisions have suggested that Seider is to be limited to instances
where the plaintiff is a New York resident. See Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411
F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey,
44 ST. JoHNr's L. REv. 313, 342 (1969) (dictum would restrict Seider to New York plaintiffs);
Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (2d Dep't 1968), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. R1v. 305, 341 (1968) (doctrine of forum non conveniens
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problems. In the past, Seider has weathered constitutional attack270 as
well as attempts by insurers to circumvent its grasp by rewriting insur-
ance policy provisions to preclude Seider attachments.27' The legisla-
ture, concerned with the breadth of the Seider doctrine,272 approved
a direct action statute which was subsequently vetoed by the Gov-
ernor.273 At present, however, the Judicial Conference has abandoned
further studies of Seider and direct action statutes.274 Thus, it appears
that Seider will continue to thrive in New York.
Since its inception in 1966, only one other state intermediate
appellate court27 r and one federal district court 27 6 have elected to
adopt the Seider rationale, while six states have directly or indirectly
rejected it.277 A new wrinkle, foreseen by Seider critics, 2 8 has now
applied to dismiss Seider action where neither party was a New York resident). Contra,
McHugh v. Paley, 63 Misc. 2d 1092, 814 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970) (per-
mitting Seider action by nonresident plaintiff against nonresident defendant and New
York co-defendant).
270Initially, the Seider doctrine was held unconstitutional in Podolsky v. Devinney,
281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). However, its constitutionality was later sustained after
the limited appearance qualification was enunciated by the Court of Appeals in Simpson.
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 896 U.S. 844 (1969).
271 See Seligman v. Tucker, 75 Misc. 2d 72, 847 N.Y.S.2d 240 (Sup. Ct. Erie County
1978), discussed in The Survey, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 611, 681 (1974), wherein the court
held void as against public policy a liability insurance policy provision disclaiming an
obligation to defend and indemnify where such an obligation would provide the sole
basis of jurisdiction over the insured.
272 Studies were conducted by the Judicial Conference concerning the need for a
direct action statute to supplant Seider. A proposed bill embodying the findings of these
studies was submitted to the Legislature. See JuDIcL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, REPORT TO THE 1973 LEGISLATURE N RELATION TO THE CIVM PRACTICE LAW AND
RuLES, PROPOSALS RELATING TO A RIGHT OF Dnmr ACION AGAINST LiABILTY INSURANCE
CARmuis, appearing in 2 N.Y. SEss. LAws 2046-50 (McKinney 1978); Rosenberg, Proposed
Direct Action Statute, 16 N.Y. Jun. CONF. REP. 264 (1971). See also Rosenberg, One Proce-
dural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider Back Into Its Bottle, 71 COLUmr. L. REv. 660
(1971).
273 The Governor vetoed the bill because of its failure to define the parties' rights
in a direct action suit with sufficient spedficity. Herzog, Conflict of Laws, in 1973 Survey
of New York Law, 25 SYRAcuSE L. REV. 11, 19 (1974).
274 See Herzog, Conflict of Laws, in 1974 Survey of New York Law, 26 SYRAcUSE L.
REv. 9, 18 (1975).
275 Turner v. Evers, 31 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 11, 107 Cal. Rptr. 890 (3d Dist. 1978).
276 Rintala v. Shoemaker, 362 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Minn. 1978) (federal court deciding
issue and adopting limited appearance requirement).
277 See Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp. 401, 408 (D. Vt. 1970) (finding Seider dissent
"more persuasive than the majority opinion on the point of 'contingency' "); State ex rel.
Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); DeRentiis v.
Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127
(1970); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 890 (1967) (rejecting jurisdiction
without mentioning Seider); Werner v. Werner, 84 Wash. 2d 860, 526 P.2d 870 (1974)
(en banc) (rejecting attempt to ground quasi-in-rem jurisdiction on existence of insurers'
potential derivative liability under surety contracts with defendant notaries).
278 See dissenting opinions cited note 269 supra.
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developed - namely, retaliatory adoption by another state. New
Hampshire has become the first state to have Seider adopted by its
highest appellate court.2 79 More significant, however, is the New
Hampshire Supreme Court's apparent intent to limit application of
the Seider doctrine to cases involving New York defendants.
In Forbes v. Boynton,210 plaintiff, a New Hampshire resident in-
jured in a car accident in Maine, sought to acquire quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction over defendant, a New York resident, through attachment
of defendant's liability insurance policy. In denying defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the trial court, apparently
overlooking the possibility of a single trial in Maine, concluded that to
rule otherwise would require duplication of the trial in New York and
New Hampshire, since the co-defendant, who operated the vehicle
owned by defendant, was a New Hampshire resident.28' According to
the court, such duplication would place an unnecessary burden upon
the plaintiff. In its view, the real party in interest was the defendant's
insurance carrier. Since the insurer did business in New Hampshire
and was therefore subject to service in the state, the trial court con-
cluded that the interests of all parties would be furthered by a single
action brought in New Hampshire. 282 The Supreme Court of New
Hampshire, in an opinion by Justice Lampron, sustained the jurisdic-
tion of the court. Justice Lampron noted that the state has a strong
interest in allowing residents injured out of state to obtain redress in
its courts, "particularly when the State of residence of the defendant
would furnish the defendant a forum if the roles were reversed."
288
This rationale is striking in two ways. First, the reasoning under-
lying the Forbes decision closely parallels the development of Seider
in New York. The Seider Court placed heavy reliance on In re Estate
of Riggle,284 wherein the New York Court of Appeals ordered the
appointment of an administrator in order to permit a suit against the
estate of a nonresident defendant. The sole asset of the New York
estate consisted of the contractual obligation to defend and indemnify
contained in the decedent's liability insurance policy. Finding that
Riggle settled the question of whether an insurer could be a debtor
for purposes of prejudgment attachment, the Seider Court held that
279 Forbes v. Boynton, 114 N.H. 617, 313 A-2d 129 (1974).
280 114 N.H. 617, 313 A.2d 129 (1974).
281 Inasmuch as the accident occurred in Maine, New York's nonresident motorist
statute, N.Y. Van. & TR. LAW § 253 (McKinney 1970), could not be used to obtain
jurisdiction in New York over the New Hampshire co-defendant.
282 114 N.H. at -, 313 A.2d at 130.
288 Id. at -, 313 A.2d at 133.
284 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.EX2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962).
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jurisdiction had been properly acquired by "attachment since the
policy obligation is a debt owed to the defendant by the insurer... ,,28
Likewise, the Forbes court found ample precedent for attachment in
Robinson v. Carroll,288 a New Hampshire case quite similar to Riggle.
In Robinson, the court concluded that a debt consisting of a promise
"not yet due... is an obligation of a contractual nature."287 The court
went on to hold that such an existing obligation was a sufficient estate
to order appointment of an administrator and thereby permit a suit
against the decedent debtor.2s8 Relying on Robinson, the Forbes court
stated that "[i]f [contractual] rights against the insurer are substantial
enough to constitute estate [sic] to support probate jurisdiction they
are sufficient to support their attachment by trustee process. ' 2 9
The second interesting aspect of the Forbes case is that its adoption
of Seider is defensive in nature, an event foreseen by critics of the
New York rule.210 If Forbes is to be construed as establishing a future
policy29' of restricting Seider-type attachments to actions in which the
defendant is a resident of a jurisdiction that has adopted the Seider
doctrine,292 a significant constitutional problem surfaces. To permit
residents of New Hampshire to attach in actions with Seider forum
286 Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 114, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102.
28087 N.H. 114, 174 A. 772 (1934). It is interesting to note that the Seider Court
cursorily adopted the reasoning of Riggle. In so holding, the Court cited decisions in
other states, including Robinson, for support. 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.Ed at 315, 269
N.Y.S.2d at 102.
287 87 N.H. at 117, 174 A. at 775.
288 Id.
289 114 N.H. at -, 313 A.2d at 132. The Forbes court further held that defendant
would be entitled to make a limited appearance and defend on the merits. Id. at -, 313
A.2d at 133.
29oSee, e.g., Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 117 (2d Cir. 1968) (Anderson, J.,
dissenting), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 US. 844 (1969).
291 The court's language in Forbes dearly indicates that its holding was strictly limited
to the facts before it:
We are not holding that the Seider rule is to be applied generally to all cases of
foreign motorists insured by a company with an office in this State and licensed
to do business in New Hampshire. We are merely holding that under the cir-
cumstances of this case in a suit by a resident of New Hampshire against a
resident of New York where the Seider rule prevails the trial court properly
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's action.
114 N.H. at -, 313 A.2d at 133 (emphasis added).
Despite this language, there is nothing contained in the court's opinion that would
preclude the application of Forbes to a suit brought by a New Hampshire plaintiff
against a nonresident defendant, whose state of residence had, like New York, adopted
the Seider rule.
292 Cf. Robitaille v. Orciuch, 382 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.H. 1974), wherein a federal dis-
trict court sitting in New Hampshire refused to apply Forbes to permit attachment of a
home owner's liability insurance policy in an action by a New Hampshire plaintiff against
a Connecticut defendant. The language the court used in reaching its decision adds cre-
dence to the argument that Forbes is intended to apply to cases involving only Seider
forum defendants. See id. at 978.
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defendants, while at the same time denying other residents of New
Hampshire the use of this jurisdictional tool where defendant is from
a non-Seider forum, arguably denies the latter group equal protection
of the law. It might be argued that such a procedure merely serves to
put New Hampshire residents on an equal footing with Seider forum
parties. However, this one-sided application must fall when one con-
siders that the primary basis for adopting a Seider procedure was to
give residents a convenient forum- a policy which should not be
limited to one class of plaintiffs.293
Seider spawns too many problems on its own, without the aid of
new variations of the doctrine such as that espoused in Forbes. Such
one-sided applications of Seider by states, even if only defensively, can
only serve to deliver up a host of problems for which neither Seider
courts nor commentators have formulated solutions.
ARTICLE 65- NOTICE OF PENDENCY
CPLR 6514: Plaintiff may not file a second notice of pendency where
a prior notice was cancelled for failure to serve a timely summons.
Prior to the adoption of the CPLR, New York courts uniformly
held that Where a prior notice of pendency 294 filed against real prop-
erty was cancelled due to the failure of a plaintiff to serve a timely
293 States are constitutionally permitted to treat classes of people differently but the
classifications
must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair anA substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253
U.S. 412, 415 (1920). While this "rational basis test" has been used primarily to test state
legislation challenged as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961), there would appear to be no reason why it should not apply in like
manner to state decisional law, since this, too, can be viewed as "state action." See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-18 (1948). Moreover, the Seider doctrine, as enunciated
in New York, has been described as a "judicially created direct action statute." Minichi-
ello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'd en banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S, 844 (1969).
294 Upon its filing with a court and indexing by the clerk of the county in which
the subject property is located, a notice of pendency provides subsequent purchasers and
encumbrancers of the property with constructive knowledge of the existence of a claim
concerning it. CPLR 6501. An individual recording a conveyance or encumbrance after
the filing of such notice is "bound by all proceedings taken in the action . . . to the
same extent as if he were a party." Id.
CPLR article 65, which contains the procedure for filing a notice of pendency, was
designed to restrict the common law doctrine of lis pendens. See 7A WK&M 1 6501.03.
At common law, a prospective purchaser of property was required to "search the court
calendar to determine whether the land he wished to buy or encumber was subject to
pending litigation." Id. 6501.01. It should be observed that CPLR article 65 applies
only to actions involving real property and not to personal property claims. CPLR 6501.
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